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Abstract:
This paper explores U.S. influence in the World Bank using panel data on World Bank
lending to 148 developing countries between 1984 and 2005.  I compare a range of UN alignment
variables (with differing interpretations), introduce other measures of U.S. interests, and control for
voting alignment with the G7 donors.  Estimation results suggest that partial correlations for U.S.
UN voting alignment partly reflect vote buying and partly reflect broader alliances.  The results
convincingly reject the hypothesis that U.S. UN voting alignment merely proxies for G7 influence
in the allocation of World Bank funds.
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A number of recent research papers find links between countries’ UN positions and the
allocation of both bilateral and multilateral aid.  Looking at U.S. bilateral aid, Kuziemko and Werker
(2006) demonstrate that the amount of aid a country receives jumps substantially while the country
occupies a rotating seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).  Applying a similar analysis to
international financial institutions (IFIs), Dreher et al. (2009B) show that a country’s probability of
receiving an IMF loan increases when it is a rotating member of the UNSC; Dreher et al. (2009A)
find a similar pattern for the number of World Bank projects a country receives.  The temporal link
between UNSC membership and increased access to IFI resources identified in all three papers
allows the authors to pin down temporary UNSC membership as the cause of privileged IFI access.
That is, there is no plausible story in which temporary UNSC membership is a proxy for some more
fundamental variable that drives access to IFI resources.
Other work on the IMF, such as the seminal study by Thacker (1999) and subsequent research
by Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008), uncover links between UN voting
patterns and access to the institution’s resources.  Likewise, a number of interesting correlations have
been discovered between UN voting and World Bank lending (Andersen, Hansen and Markussen
2006; Kilby 2009).  The studies of UN voting mostly examine links between UN voting alignment
with the U.S. and access to international assistance funding though a few studies have looked more
broadly (Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Kilby 2006, 2009; Neumayer 2003).
In contrast to the work on UNSC membership, this burgeoning literature has not identified
as clearly what particular donor interest variables actually measure.  A number of different variables
(with potentially different interpretations) have been employed.  UN voting may proxy for broader
alliances or simply commonality of interests (Stone 2004).  Similarly, if the voting patterns of OECD commitment data for the IBRD are not currently available since IBRD loans are not
1
concessional enough to qualify as Official Development Assistance (ODA).
Available data on UNGA voting (Voeten, 2006) include only regular session roll call votes
2
on adopted resolutions (i.e., resolutions that passed).  The data exclude emergency session votes,
consensus resolutions, votes on the writing of resolutions (e.g., paragraph votes), and votes on
resolutions that are not adopted.  The U.S. State Department "important vote" data include all types
of votes but I exclude measures adopted by consensus.  Since the early 1990s, the State Department
2
powerful donors are correlated, the apparent impact of alignment with U.S. voting may in fact reflect
the combined influence of several countries, e.g., the G7.
This paper has two goals.  First, it aims to develop a better understanding of what donor
interest variables measure when they are included in the analysis of flows from international
financial institutions.  Second, it fills a hole in the literature on UN voting alignment and IFIs by
examining this link in the context of the World Bank Group.  The recent studies by Andersen, Harr
and Tarp (2006) and Neumayer (2003) are limited to the International Development Association
(IDA), the soft window of the World Bank that accounts for about a third of total lending.  Kilby
(2009) does examine both branches of the World Bank but focuses on enforcement of structural
adjustment conditionality rather than loan allocation per se.
To this end, I use panel methods to examine both eligibility for World Bank funds and the
level of funding provided when funds are made available.  I aggregate across the two main branches
of the World Bank–the IDA and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD)–and focus on gross disbursement data.   I examine U.S. interest variables primarily because
1
the U.S. is clearly the most influential donor in the organization and data reflecting U.S. interests are
much more readily available.  However, where possible, I include parallel variables for the other G7
countries.  U.S. interest variables include alignment on UNGA regular session votes and alignment
on just those measures designated as important by the U.S. State Department.   I also use data on
2also reports voting coincidence separately without resolutions adopted by consensus.  Note that in
specifications including year fixed effects, results will not depend on how consensus votes are
treated.
There are a few notable early statistical analyses, e.g., Frey and Schneider (1986).
3
3
bilateral economic aid and U.S. bilateral military aid to construct additional donor interest variables.
The next section provides a selective review of the literature using UN voting alignment to
gauge donor influence in IFIs.  I emphasize the rationale for the approaches taken.  Section III
describes the data used in my analysis while Section IV presents estimation results.  The final section
provides discussion and suggestions for future research.
II. Literature Review
There is a substantial body of research examining the role donor interests play in IFIs.  While
most IFI charters prohibit non-economic considerations in lending decisions (the notable exception
being the EBRD), there is ample anecdotal evident of cases where donor geopolitical or commercial
interests have been influential.  Over the last decade, the literature broadened to include more
statistical analysis.   An important issue for empirical work is how to capture geopolitical interests
3
in a consistent fashion across countries and over time.  UN voting data are particularly appealing in
this regard and several different UN voting alignment measures have been constructed.
There is considerable debate about what UN voting represents – and how much it matters.
One position holds that votes are reflective of geopolitics (measuring "political proximity") but are
not necessarily geopolitically important themselves.  In his seminal study of IMF lending in Africa,
Stone puts this very clearly:  "I assume that patrons are not concerned about how African countries
vote in the UN General Assembly but, rather, that these votes are unimportant enough to serve asI use the term "narrowly rational" because vote buying is the outcome of a rational actor
4
model that considers only the vote at hand, not broader issues.
4
a sincere measure of countries’ foreign policy preferences."  (Stone 2004, 580)  This contrasts with
a narrowly rational view of voting where outcomes reflect vote buying rather than being a "sincere
measure of countries' foreign policy preferences."   At least since Wittkopf (1973), there has been
4
debate about whether some UN votes matter more for foreign aid than other votes.  This may
indicate that only these select votes reflect important dimensions of foreign policy preference (i.e.,
have meaningful geopolitical content) or that the outcome of the votes themselves is of geopolitical
importance to powerful states.  
A number of studies use alignment on all UNGA votes.  Generally drawn from data
assembled by Voeten (2006), these measures typically use average annual voting coincidence with
an abstention or absence given half weight.  Work on the IMF includes Barro and Lee (2005), Dreher
and Jensen (2007), Dreher et al. (2008), Oatley and Yackley (2004), and Stone (2004).  These studies
generally take UN voting as a measure of political proximity although some are carefully agnostic
about exactly what voting similarities measure.  For example, Oatley and Yackley (2004, 425)
summarize their geopolitical findings as follows:  "The IMF offers larger loans to governments who
regularly vote with the United States in the UN than to governments who vote less regularly with
the US."
Since 1983, the U.S. State Department has published an annual report entitled Voting
Practices in the United Nations that identifies votes considered important by the State Department.
Following its mandate in Section 406 of US PL 101-246, the State Department designates as
important “votes on issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United
States lobbied extensively.”  (U.S. State Department 2007, 123)   Wang (1999) argues that U.S.In the context of World Bank lending, the measure including abstentions and absences yields
5
somewhat stronger results than alternatives that omit absences, abstentions or both.
Thacker uses voting alignment in year t!2 as his measure of political proximity but the
6
change from year t!2 to t!1 as the measure of political movement.
5
interests are better measured by examining just these votes;  including other votes essentially adds
noise.  Likewise, Thacker (1999) argues that these designated votes are more indicative of support
for the U.S. and that both the U.S. and other countries are well-aware of this fact.  Voting Practices
in the United Nations also includes voting coincidence figures based on these important votes,
reporting the number of votes identical to the U.S. divided by the sum of identical and opposite votes
(ignoring abstentions and absences).  Wang utilizes this measure while Thacker improves on it by
treating abstentions and absences as "neutral," including them with a weight of one half in the
numerator and with full weight in the denominator.  The resulting voting alignment variable based
on these key votes (kvotes) ranges between 0 and 1.  Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006) use
the State Department/Wang definition while Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006), Kilby (2009), and
Vreeland (2005) use a measure similar to Thacker.
5
In his study of IMF lending, Thacker uses kvotes and its change or "movement" over time
(mkvotes) to test both a political proximity hypothesis (the U.S. uses the IMF to reward friends and
punish enemies) and a political movement hypothesis (the U.S. uses the IMF to reward countries that
move toward the U.S. position over time).  In his fully specified model, Thacker finds strong support
for the political movement hypothesis only.
6
The theory behind Thacker's political movement hypothesis is not fully spelled.  We could
simply take it as given that the U.S. rewards movements toward its position.  However, Thacker does
refer to vote buying models where the voter is compensated for costly deviations from its idealVreeland (2005) uses Thacker's political movement variable but does not indicate if it should
7
be interpreted as linked to vote buying.
Parallel to Thacker, AHT use voting alignment on all votes in year t!2 but voting alignment
8
on important votes in year t!1.
AHT's procedure allows a test of the political proximity model against the vote buying
9
model although they do not pursue this.
6
position.  Assuming a stable ideal position relative to the U.S. position, an increase in voting
alignment with the U.S. indicates a greater deviation from the country's ideal point and hence a
greater cost that needs to be compensated through an increased probability of receiving an IMF
package.
7
Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006) (henceforth AHT) develop a formal vote buying model and
propose methods to deal with the ideal point.  They use UN voting alignment on all votes as a proxy
for the country's ideal point (relative to the U.S. position).  Differences between voting alignment
on important votes and all votes reflect political movement, i.e., concessions to the U.S. (bid in
AHT's loan allocation model).  This implicitly assumes a degree of symmetry between important
votes and other votes.   Estimating an equation with both bid and Thacker's mkvotes, ATH find that
8
bid is statistically significant while mkvotes is not.  In the context of a vote buying model, this
suggests that overall voting alignment is a reasonable proxy for a country's ideal point.
9
One way to compare Thacker and AHT is in terms of a latent variable model with vote
it it buying.  Let L * be a latent variable such that the IFI grants a loan to country i in period t if L *
exceeds some critical value (normalized to 0):
it it L = 1 if L *>0 (1)
it = 0 if L *#0
The latent variable reflects the IFI's assessment of the merits of granting a loan (the size of whichThe timing of other variables is tricky as one must balance the need for timeliness against
10
questions of endogeneity (e.g., getting an IMF loan could influence economic aggregates).  Thacker
and AHT use levels of the variables from year t!1 and changes between years t!1 and t.  In the case
of the World Bank, these issues are less critical.
7
may depend on other factors), an assessment that may include economic and political considerations.
One such political consideration is the preference of important donors country like the United States.
The donor, in turn, prefers to reward countries that have made costly concessions to its position, i.e.,
it it uses access to IFI funds as a form of payment in its vote buying endeavors.  Define kvotes  as
i country i's actual voting alignment with the U.S. in year t.  Define Bliss as country i's preferred
voting alignment with the U.S.; here, I assume this is constant over time.  If the cost to a country of
it deviating from its preferred votes is increasing in the degree of deviation, we can think of L * as
determined by
it 01 it-1 2 it-1 i 3 it it L * = $  + $ kvotes  + $ (kvotes !Bliss) + $ X  + g (2)
it it where X  captures other measured factors (including economic considerations) and g  reflects the
g combined effects of unobserved variables, randomly distributed with mean 0 and variance F  and
2
uncorrelated with the included variables.  Equation (2) specifies votes from year t!1 because UN
votes generally happen in the last four months of the year.   The political proximity hypothesis is
10
12 equivalent to $ >0 while the vote buy model has $ >0.  To estimate (2), one either uses a proxy for
i Bliss (e.g., AHT's UN voting alignment with the U.S. on all measures passed) or a fixed effects
estimation method.
Using this vote buying framework, Thacker's specification excludes two variables.  Equation
(2) can be rewritten as
it 01 it-1 2 it!1 2 i 2 it-2 3 it it L * = $  + $ kvotes  + $ mkvotes  !$ Bliss + $ kvotes  + $ X  + g (3)
it!1 it-1 it-2 i it-1 Recalling that mkvotes  = kvotes  ! kvotes , Thacker's specification omits Bliss and kvotes .This may be reasonable in the context of UN votes designated as important by the U.S.;
11
many votes (on human rights, Israel, etc.) reappear year after year.  This is mathematically equivalent
to a bliss point that shift every year to last year's actual important vote alignment.
8
In a rational actor model with a fixed ideal point, countries need to be rewarded for moving toward
the U.S. position not just in the first year they do so but for as long as they maintain this costly
activity.
Alternative, one could view mkvotes as an attempt to eliminate an unknown bliss point
through first differencing (2):
it it!1 1 it-1 it-2 2 it-1 it-2 3 it it!1 it it!1 L *!L * = $ (kvotes !kvotes ) + $ (kvotes !kvotes ) + $ (X !X ) + g !g (3')
or
it 12 it-1 3 it it )L * = ($  + $ )mkvotes  + $) X + )g (3")
This formulation presents two problems.  First, the coefficient on mkvotes is positive under either
hypothesis (proximity or vote buying) and the coefficient on the kvotes variable in Thacker's
specification should be zero under either hypothesis.  Second, the link between the new latent
it it it variable )L * and the observable variable (L  or even )L ) is no longer clear if (1) is correct;  it is
also unclear how to estimate (3').
To justify Thacker's estimated model in terms of vote buying, political movement itself must
be costly.  Rather than the country incurring a cost whenever it deviates from its fixed bliss point (as
above), the country incurs costs only in the first year it changes its voting behavior.  Voting the same
way in subsequent years is costless.   This scenario justifies a latent variable model parallel to
11
Thacker's empirical specification:
it 01 it-1 2 it-1 3 it it L * = (  + ( kvotes  + ( mkvotes  + ( X  + L (4)
The U.S. rewards the country (via pressure on the IFI) when the costly political movement takes9
2 place (( >0) but not in subsequent years when the country costlessly stays at the same location.
1 Conversely, the political proximity hypothesis has ( >0.  Thacker's specification differs slightly from
it!2i t ! 1 (4) as it includes kvotes  rather kvotes :
it 01 it-2 2 it-1 3 it it L * = (  + ( 'kvotes  + ( 'mkvotes  + ( X  + L (5)
it!2i t ! 1i t ! 1 11 21 2 Since  kvotes +mkvotes =kvotes , equations (4) and (5) are equivalent if ( ' = (  and ( ' = ( +( .
11 If (4) is the correct specification, the political proximity hypothesis (( >0) predicts both ( '>0 and
2 ( '>0 in (5).
While most of the existing research has focused on the IMF, UN voting alignment measures
can be used to explore the same questions for lending by multilateral development banks (MDBs).
Estimation for MDBs poses some slightly different problems.  IMF programs are somewhat
sporadic;  most countries in the sample have some years with programs and some years without.
This variation allows estimation of a conditional logit selection or eligibility equation with country
fixed effects while still preserving a broad cross section of countries.  AHT take advantage of this
as an alternate approach to including the bliss point for a voting buying model.  In contrast, many
countries receive MDB funds every year and hence would drop from a selection equation including
country fixed effects.  However, this higher frequency of lending makes estimating an allocation
equation (examining the level of funding for countries that do get funds) a more useful exercise for
MDB lending.
Neumayer (2003) includes the IDA in his analysis of the role of governance factors in ODA.
Estimating a two part model using data from the 1990s, Neumayer finds overall UN voting similarity
(a DAC weighted average of voting similarity on all UN votes) insignificant in both the selection and
allocation equations.
Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2006) also examine IDA lending but focus on UN10
important votes rather than overall votes.  In a Heckman selection model, the authors find UN voting
coincidence with the U.S. on important votes is insignificant in the selection equation but uniformly
significant in the allocation equation, i.e., in determining how much IDA funding countries get.
Because there is no theoretical basis for exclusion restrictions, identification relies on the inherent
non-linearity of the probit in the selection equation.  The estimated link between voting alignment
and the size of IDA loans does not appear sensitive to selection effects as the unconditional estimate
closely matches the conditional estimate in size and significance.  The impact of voting alignment
is sizeable with a one standard deviation increase in voting alignment corresponding to a $34 million
increase in loan size.
Kilby (2006) investigates American and Japanese influence in Asian Development Bank
(ADB) lending.  Because one of the goals of that paper is to compare the influence of these two
important donors, the UN voting alignment variable includes all votes since the list of important
votes for Japan could differ from the list for the U.S.  In a two part model, neither voting alignment
measure (Japanese or U.S.) is significant in the selection equation.  In the allocation equation, there
are no links across the estimation period (1968-2002) but alignment with Japan is associated with
a smaller share of ADB disbursements in the first half of the period (1968-1986) and a larger share
in the second half (1987-2002).
III. Data
The data use in this analysis are described in Table 1.  Variables include aid flows (from the
World Bank and various bilateral donors), recipient country economic and political characteristics,
UN voting alignments, and military aid.  The unit of observation is the recipient country/year.  The
sample is determined by data availability.  Important UN voting data starts in 1983 while DAC dataI set the sample for each equation based on the most restrictive basic specification so that
12
the sample size is constant.  Results are the same without this restriction.
I use OECD (2006) data for countries dropped from OECD (2007).
13
The variable suffix "tofg" designates "total offical gross disbursements."
14
11
on aid flows ends with 2005.  Given the lag structure used, this restricts the sample to 1984 to 2005.
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the eligibility equation (2874 observations on 148 countries
with an average 19 observations per country) and the allocation equation (2262 observations on 134
countries with an average of 17 observations per country).
12
Aid flows are measured by total official gross disbursements from OECD (2006) and OECD
(2007).   I use disbursements rather than commitments because the OECD reports the latter for
13
ODA only; IBRD loans are at too high an interest rate to qualify as ODA.  Some scholars argue in
favor of using commitments because the level of disbursements is influenced by recipient
government behavior (e.g., the speed at which projects are implemented, whether or not the
government satisfies conditionality, etc.) but there is also evidence of donor influence beyond the
commitment stage, directly on disbursements (e.g., Kilby 2009).  The dependent variable in the
eligibility equation (WB_elig) is equal to one if the country received any World Bank disbursements
in the given year and equal to zero otherwise.  The dependent variable in the allocation equation
(ln_WB_tofg) is the natural log of IDA and IBRD disbursements to the country in the given year.
14
Recipient country characteristics used in the analysis are also described in Table 1.  These
include a purchasing power parity measure of GDP per capita and population.  The dummy variable
"blend" indicates countries that have access to both IDA and IBRD funds.  The Freedom House
index (FH) is the simple average of the political rights and civil liberties indices; higher values
indicate fewer rights/liberties.  The "polity" variable ranges from !10 (complete autocracy) to +10Alternatively, the alignment measure can be calculated directly from tables in the State
15
Department reports.  The resulting variable differs from that based on Voeten (2006) because a few
votes covered by the State Department are not covered in Voeten's data set and because of a few
coding differences.  The sample correlation between the two is 0.89; most results are qualitatively
similar but slightly stronger based directly on State Department data.  Note that for calculating voting
alignment with other G7 countries (rather than with the U.S.), only the first method is feasible
without access to the State Department's database.   Therefore, I use variables base on the first
method for tables 2 through 4.  However, I use variables based on the second method in tables 5
through 7 to make them more comparable to Thacker and AHT (who appear to use State Department
data directly).
12
(complete democracy).  The dummy variable "war" indicates a major conflict with more than 1000
conflict related deaths in that year.  Both World Bank lending and UN voting may be related to
country characteristics and hence these are important control variables.
The key right hand side variables for this analysis are measures of UN voting alignment.
Data on UN voting come from two sources.  As mentioned above, Voting Practices in the United
Nations (U.S. State Department, 1983-2007) designates which UN votes are considered important
by the U.S.  Vote level data come from Voeten (2006) which go through 2005.  The voting alignment
calculation is the same as in Kilby (2006, 2009) and closely follows Thacker (1999) and Dreher and
Jensen (2007).  For each vote, a country scores a 1 if it follows the U.S., a 0.5 if it abstains or is
absent when the U.S. votes (or vice versa), and a 0 if it opposes the U.S.  A country’s alignment is
its mean score for the year.  Applying this method directly to the Voeten data yields the UN voting
alignment with the U.S. on all votes (UN1_US).  I do the same with the other G7 countries as a
group (UN1_G7).  Repeating this procedure with the sample restricted to those votes that appear on
the State Department list gives voting alignment on important votes (UN2_US and UN2_G7).
15
I use bilateral economic and military aid as additional measures of geopolitical interests and
alignments.  These include bilateral economic aid from the U.S. and from the other G7 countries.
However, bilateral aid could also proxy for need factors not already included in the equations (i.e.,The like-minded donors are Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  See
16
Fleck and Kilby (2006) for more discussion.
This results in 22 changes for the like-minded donors and 221 changes for the U.S.  Results
17
are not sensitive to the choice of the "trivial" value.  The alternative of dropping these observations
does increase the p-value on US voting alignment from p=0.025 to p=0.059.  Using the binary
variable for US aid gives roughly the same results as reported in the table below.
13
beyond population, GDP per capita and governance) and complicate interpretation of the estimated
coefficients.  To mitigate this possibility, I also include aid from the "like-minded" donors known
for their relatively humanitarian practices.   The eligibility equation includes dummy variables
16
indicating positive levels of U.S. and like-minded donor bilateral economic aid.  However, since all
country/years in the sample have positive G7 aid, I use the amount of G7 disbursements (in log
terms) rather a dichotomous variable.  In the allocation equation, all three are included as logs of the
level of aid disbursements.  To avoid log of zero and thereby shrinking the sample, I add 0.01 to each
value before taking logs.  This figure ($10,000 or !4.065 in log terms) is the lowest positive
disbursement level reported in the raw data.
17
Although the two samples differ by about 600 observations, the mean values of the variables
change relatively little.  The most notable changes are the percentage receiving significant U.S.
military aid which rises from 38.2 percent to 42.8 percent and the average polity score which rises
from 1.50 to 1.76.  The average and range for population is remarkably similar while the very highest
income observations are cut.  The most surprising feature is the lack of change in the UN voting
alignments across the two samples.  The only evident change is a fall in the maximum value for
alignment with the U.S. on all UN votes (Israel and Micronesia).
IV.  Estimation Results14
I start by estimating the equations that follow most naturally from the discussion in section
II.  For the eligibility equation, this is:
it 01 it-1 2 it-1 3 it it WB_elig * = "  + " UN1_US  + " UN2_US  + " X  + g (6)
2 If UN2_US does capture all the relevant votes, we expect " >0.  If in addition, the political proximity
1 hypothesis is correct, " =0.  Alternative, if UN1_US reflects true preferences (the bliss point) and
12 1 2 UN2_US reflects the influence of vote buying, we have instead " <0, " >0 and " +" =0.  I estimate
a similar equation for allocation.  If a country's foreign policy preferences are stable (constant bliss
it-1 point), we can replace UN1_US  by country fixed effects in an allocation equation.  All
specifications include unreported year dummies and (in the absence of country fixed effects) region
dummies.
Table 2 presents estimation results for the basic eligibility equation.  The results for country
characteristics mostly fit a priori expectations and are similar across different specifications of the
eligibility equation.  Larger countries are significantly more likely to receive disbursements (possibly
the result of having more commitments) while richer countries are less likely to do so.  Higher
Freedom House scores reflect fewer political rights and civil liberties and are associated with a lower
probability of receiving disbursements.  The estimated coefficient for polity is negative but not
statistically significant.  Finally, countries in the midst of major conflicts are significantly less likely
to receive disbursements.
Column 1 of Table 2 includes UN1_US, alignment with the U.S. on all UN votes.  The
negative and significant coefficient indicates that countries voting like the U.S. on all UN votes are
less likely to receive World Bank funds than others.  This is not consistent with the political
proximity hypothesis if these votes reflect countries’ foreign policy preferences.  Column 2 uses
alignment on important votes only; the estimated coefficient is now positive but not statistically15
significant.  Thus, even if the relevant foreign policy preferences are reflected only in the important
votes, we fail to reject the hypothesis that political proximity is unimportant for access to World
Bank funds.  Column 3 includes both alignment measures.  The results are now consistent with the
vote buying hypothesis outlined above.  The estimated coefficient on UN1_US is negative and
statistically significant.  The estimated coefficient on UN2_US is positive and statistically
significant.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients sum to 0, i.e., that the probability
of receiving World Bank funds depends on the difference between alignment with the U.S. on
important votes and on all votes.  This is largely consistent with AHT's findings for access to IMF
funding.
Table 3 repeats this process for the conditional allocation equation, using both ordinary least
squares and fixed effects methods.  As one might expect, the role of country characteristics depends
to some degree on the decision stage (eligibility or allocation) and on the estimation method (OLS
or fixed effects).  Larger aid-receiving countries get more funds but the effect is purely cross
sectional.  While poorer countries were more likely to get World Bank disbursements, income has
little impact on the level of funding received though countries can expect more funding when their
income level is below their own average.  Overall, blend countries (those drawing on both IBRD and
IDA funds) do not receive significantly more funds but they do receive more than their own average
while they have blend status.  Aid-receiving countries with better (i.e., lower) Freedom House ratings
get more disbursements.  Oddly, countries receive more funding during periods of below normal
polity ratings.
Turning to our variables of interest, we see again see a pattern consistent with vote buying
where only the votes the U.S. designates as important matter.  UN2_US is significant and positive
but only in fixed effects specifications, an outcome consistent with vote buying if countries' ideal16
points (in terms of the degree of alignment with the U.S. on important votes) are stable over time.
The main difference from the eligibility equation is that UN1_US does not appear to be a sufficiently
good proxy for a country's bliss point.  Nonetheless, in the specifications that include both UN
variables, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients sum to zero, i.e., that the correct
specification is in terms difference between them.
Table 4 introduces additional geopolitical variables.  Columns 1 (eligibility) and 2 (fixed
effects allocation) include other indicators of U.S. geopolitical ties.  Receiving a non-trivial amount
of U.S. military aid is associated with a significantly higher probability of World Bank
disbursements but has no apparent link with the level of disbursements for those countries that do
get World Bank funds.  Countries receiving U.S. bilateral aid are significantly more likely to also
receive World Bank funds and, for countries that do receive World Bank funds, the level of funding
is significantly higher when U.S. bilateral aid is higher.  These results are consistent with U.S. aid
proxying for U.S. geopolitical (or commercial) interests.  But they are also consistent with U.S. aid
as a proxy for elements of need not captured by GDP, population, etc.  To account for this, I include
parallel variables for the so-called like-minded donor countries.  These donors have a reputation for
relatively need-based aid (making these variables a better need proxy than the U.S. variable) but
relatively little power within the World Bank.  These variables enter with the expected sign and
significance while U.S. aid variables remain significant.
With these additional geopolitical variables, the estimated coefficients for the UN variables
are slightly smaller in magnitude.  Individually, their signs and significance match the vote buying
hypothesis as before.  However, for the eligibility equation, we now reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients on UN1_US and UN2_US sum to zero.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 add the available geopolitical variables for the other G717
countries as a group.  In the eligibility equation, G7 voting alignment on all votes enters with a
negative sign (though not significant) while G7 voting alignment on important votes proves to be
statistically significant, ceteris paribus.  U.S. voting alignment on all votes continues as negative and
significant but the estimated coefficient on U.S. voting alignment on important votes switches sign
(from positive to negative) and becomes statistically insignificant.  This does suggest that apparent
U.S. influence was in fact proxying for broader G7 influence in eligibility for World Bank
disbursements.  However, the previous results for the allocation equation are robust to the inclusion
of the G7 variables, the latter both proving insignificant in this equation.
Table 5 presents specifications more directly linked to Thacker (1999).  As pointed out by
AHT (2006) and in section II above, this specification may suffer from omitted variable bias if the
vote buying model is correct.  The first three columns are eligibility equations that more closely
correspond to Thacker's analysis of the IMF.  Column 1 presents a version of the political movement
t-1 it-1 hypothesis.  The hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on )UN2_US  (equivalent to mkvotes )
as the U.S. uses its influence in the World Bank to favor countries that move toward the U.S.
position on important votes in the UN.  However, in the World Bank case, the coefficient is negative
t-1 and significant.  Column 2 adds UN2_US  which I argued in section II is the correct specification
of the kvotes variable for the political proximity hypothesis.  This enters with a positive and
marginally significant coefficient while political movement continues to enter with a significant,
t-1 negative coefficient.  Column 3 demonstrates the problem with including UN2_US  (equivalently
it-2 t-1 kvotes ) as the coefficient on the UN2_US variable is unchanged but the coefficient on )UN2_US
is now the sum of the coefficients from the political proximity and political movement hypotheses.
Columns 4 to 6 parallel the first three columns for an allocation equation without fixed
effects.  The political movement variable is positive and significant in the first specification; the18
variables have the hypothesized signs but are not statistically significant in the other specifications.
In short, these results give only weak support for the political movement hypothesis as
operationalized.
Tables 6 and 7 present specifications more directly linked to AHT with eligibility equation
specifications in the first of these tables and allocation equation specifications in the second.
Column 1 of Table 6 reproduces the full basic specification in Table 2, Column 3 but without sample
restrictions and using data directly from the U.S. State Department.  Results are essentially as before.
 Note that this specification includes UN1_US (bliss point proxy) and UN2_US (important votes)
from the same year while AHT use an additional lag of UN1_US, perhaps to match Thacker.
Column 2 switches to this lagged value which results in a slight decrease in the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients and the size of the t-statistics.  Column 3 includes both bliss point proxies.
While we might expect them to be individually insignificant but jointly significant because of a 0.88
correlation between them (suggesting that they are equally good proxies), the one from the same year
as the important votes is highly significant while the other is not.  Indeed, we can even reject the
hypothesis that they enter with the same coefficient.
This result suggests two things.  First, the bliss point proxy should come from the same year
as the important vote variable.  Second, a country's preferred foreign policy position may not be
t-1 static, i.e., the time-varying overall vote alignment (UN1_US ) may be a better measure of the bliss
point than a constant value.  Column 4 pursues this idea by including  , the average value
t-1 of UN1_US for each country.  When included without UN1_US , this constant bliss point proxy
enters as negative and significant (not shown).  When both variables are included (Column 4), they





Table 7 repeats these specifications for the allocation equation.  The above lessons are
t-2 exactly reversed.  In this case, UN1_US  appears to be the better proxy and the constant bliss point
(here again set by   ) is statistically significant even if we allow for a time varying bliss
t-1 t-2 point (using either UN1_US  or UN1_US ).  This remains a theoretical puzzle though in practical
terms it provides further support for using a fixed effects specification in the allocation equation.
V.  Conclusions
This paper examines links between UN voting and disbursement of funds by the World Bank.
Comparable past studies restricted attention to the one third of World Bank lending done by the IDA.
In addition, the more sophisticated notions of UN voting alignment put forward by Thacker (1999)
and Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006) in studies of the IMF had not been applied broadly to its sister
institution.  This paper attempts to apply those notions in a systematic fashion that more directly
links theory and empirics.  The goal is to generate a better understanding of what partial correlations
between UN voting alignment and lending by IFIs actually reflect.  While the empirical work focuses
on alignment with the US in UN voting, I include a range of other donor interest variables (bilateral
aid, military aid and alignment with the other G7 countries in UN voting) to avoid a single variable
reflecting the combined effect of all these factors.
The results presented in this paper are generally consistent with a vote buying model linking
alignment on UN voting and the allocation of World Bank funds.  Many of the details are perhaps
less clear:  To what extent is it U.S. influence alone rather than the combined weight of the G7?  Do20
the mechanisms or goals vary systematically?  What does appear clear is that the major alternative
models – political proximity or political movement not based on vote buying – appear broadly
inconsistent with the estimation results.21
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description Source
Eligibility Equation Sample
WB_elig 2742 0.787 0 1 binary, 1 if World Bank gross disbursements > 0
ln_pop 2742 15.469 1.994 10.600 20.989 log population
ln_gdp 2742 8.224 0.928 6.252 10.569 log PPP GDP per capita in millions of 2006 US$
FH 2742 3.971 1.830 1 7 average of Freedom House PR and CL scores
polity 2742 1.500 6.915 !10 10 Polity 2 Index (autocracy to democracy)
war 2742 0.064 0 1 binary, 1 if more than 1000 deaths from conflict in year
t!1 UN1_US 2742 0.351 0.120 0 0.914 0 to 1, alignment with U.S. on all UN votes
t!1 UN2_US 2742 0.474 0.182 0 1 0 to 1, alignment with U.S. on important UN votes
t!1 UN1_G7 2742 0.637 0.087 0.457 0.909 0 to 1, alignment with other G7 on all UN votes
t!1 UN2_G7 2742 0.662 0.144 0.161 1 0 to 1, alignment with other G7 on important UN votes
sig_US_mil 2742 0.382 0 1 binary, 1 if U.S. military aid > $500,000
US_elig 2742 0.844 0 1 binary, 1 if U.S. economic aid > 0
LM_elig 2742 0.947 0 1 binary, 1 if "like-minded" donor aid > 0
ln_G7_tofg 2742 3.584 2.441 !4.605 8.606 log other G7 bilateral aid in millions of 2005 US$
A
Allocation Equation Sample
ln_WB_tofg 2262 3.626 1.959 !4.605 8.110 log World Bank disbursements in millions of 2005 US$
ln_pop 2262 15.676 1.951 10.600 20.989 log population
ln_gdp 2262 8.032 0.843 6.252 9.854 log PPP GDP per capita in millions of 2006 US$
blend 2262 0.147 0 1 binary, 1 if receiving disbursements from both IDA and IBRD
FH 2262 3.940 1.739 1 7 average of Freedom House PR and CL scores
polity 2262 1.763 6.678 !10 10 Polity 2 Index (autocracy to democracy)
war 2262 0.064 0 1 binary, 1 if more than 1000 deaths from conflict in year
t!1 UN1_US 2262 0.346 0.110 0 0.691 0 to 1, alignment with U.S. on all UN votes
t!1 UN2_US 2262 0.476 0.171 0 1 0 to 1, alignment with U.S. on important UN votes
t!1 UN1_G7 2262 0.637 0.084 0.468 0.909 0 to 1, alignment with other G7 on all UN votes
t!1 UN2_G7 2262 0.667 0.135 0.161 1 0 to 1, alignment with other G7 on important UN votes
sig_US_mil 2262 0.428 0 1 binary, 1 if U.S. military aid > $500,000
ln_US_tofg 2262 2.241 2.883 !4.605 8.959 log U.S. economic aid in millions of 2005 US$
A
ln_LM_tofg 2262 2.548 2.170 !4.605 6.259 log "like-minded" donor bilateral aid in millions of 2005 US$
A
ln_G7_tofg 2262 4.272 1.538 !3.506 8.606 log other G7 bilateral aid in millions of 2005 US$
A
log (variable + 0.01) to avoid log of zero. All aid variables defined in terms of gross disbursements.
A24
Table 2 – Eligibility Equation
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: WB_elig WB_elig WB_elig
Method: Probit Probit Probit
ln_pop 0.201** 0.220** 0.192**
(4.53) (5.04) (4.30)
ln_gdp -0.817** -0.799** -0.837**
(-6.02) (-5.79) (-5.89)
FH -0.301** -0.263** -0.247**
(-3.01) (-2.61) (-2.47)
polity -0.0159 -0.0197 -0.0122
(-0.69) (-0.81) (-0.53)
war -0.864** -0.850** -0.814**
(-3.32) (-3.34) (-3.24)
t!1 UN1_US -1.513* -3.274**
A
(-1.88) (-3.63)
t!1 UN2_US 0.635 1.985**
A
(1.09) (3.31)
N 2742 2742 2742
t statistics in parentheses.  Computed from clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.05
All specifications include region and year dummies.  
Fail to reject hypothesis that coefficients sum to zero (p=0.11)
A25
Table 3 – Allocation Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg
Method: OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
ln_pop 0.890** 0.0637 0.897** 0.0911 0.889** 0.0939
(24.08) (0.17) (24.74) (0.24) (23.89) (0.25)
ln_gdp -0.0421 -0.339** -0.0403 -0.339** -0.0447 -0.357**
(-0.42) (-2.33) (-0.40) (-2.37) (-0.45) (-2.47)
blend 0.0594 0.155* 0.0620 0.177** 0.0713 0.180**
(0.47) (1.92) (0.48) (2.18) (0.55) (2.22)
FH -0.175** -0.148** -0.169** -0.133** -0.165** -0.133**
(-2.79) (-4.04) (-2.68) (-3.63) (-2.65) (-3.64)
polity -0.0150 -0.0259** -0.0147 -0.0244** -0.0141 -0.0245**
(-0.90) (-2.87) (-0.88) (-2.72) (-0.85) (-2.72)
war -0.377** -0.446** -0.377** -0.450** -0.371** -0.450**
(-2.62) (-4.75) (-2.60) (-4.81) (-2.56) (-4.81)
t!1 UN1_US -0.503 0.328 -1.077 -0.319
AA
(-0.84) (0.89) (-1.55) (-0.78)
t!1 UN2_US 0.237 0.784** 0.603 0.865**
AA
(0.69) (3.67) (1.58) (3.64)
N 2262 2262 2262 2262 2262 2262
t statistics in parentheses.  Computed from clustered standard errors for OLS.
* p<.1, ** p<.05
All specifications include year dummies.  OLS specifications include region dummies.
Fail to reject hypothesis that coefficients sum to zero (Column 5:  p=0.44; Column 6: p=0.14)
A26
Table 4 – Additional Geopolitical Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: WB_elig ln_WB_tofg WB_elig ln_WB_tofg
Method: Probit FE Probit FE
ln_pop 0.103** -0.0661 -0.0557 -0.00688
(2.37) (-0.18) (-0.96) (-0.02)
ln_gdp -0.791** -0.351** -0.704** -0.464**
(-6.11) (-2.45) (-5.63) (-3.25)
blend 0.220** 0.255**
(2.74) (3.21)
FH -0.202** -0.134** -0.146 -0.133**
(-2.08) (-3.70) (-1.54) (-3.71)
polity -0.00932 -0.0279** -0.00840 -0.0282**
(-0.41) (-3.13) (-0.38) (-3.21)
war -0.800** -0.408** -0.756** -0.386**
(-3.13) (-4.41) (-3.16) (-4.21)
t!1 UN1_US -3.081** -0.286 -1.871* -0.304
BA B A
(-3.25) (-0.71) (-1.92) (-0.71)
t!1 UN2_US 1.377** 0.719** -0.909 0.917**
BA B A
(2.38) (3.03) (-1.26) (2.31)
t!1 UN1_G7 -1.929 0.509
CC
(-1.35) (0.61)
t!1 UN2_G7 2.982** -0.533
CC
(3.47) (-1.10)
sig_US_mil 0.586** -0.0135 0.454** -0.0260











N 2742 2262 2742 2262
t statistics in parentheses.   Computed from clustered standard errors for probits.
* p<.1, ** p<.05
All specifications include year dummies.  Probit specifications include region dummies.
Fail to reject hypothesis that coefficients sum to zero (Column 2:  p=0.24; Column 4: p=0.13)
A
Reject the hypothesis that coefficients sum to zero (Column 1: p=0.048; Column 3: p=.003)
B
Fail to reject hypothesis that coefficients sum to zero (Column 3:  p=0.45; Column 4: p=0.97)
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Table 5 – Thacker-type Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: WB_elig WB_elig WB_elig ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg
Method: Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
ln_pop 0.181** 0.188** 0.188** 0.893** 0.895** 0.895**
(4.15) (4.26) (4.26) (24.56) (24.42) (24.42)
ln_gdp -0.955** -0.951** -0.951** -0.0448 -0.0449 -0.0449
(-7.17) (-6.99) (-6.99) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.46)
blend 0.0463 0.0482 0.0482
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
FH -0.316** -0.266** -0.266** -0.169** -0.165** -0.165**
(-3.02) (-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.64) (-2.57) (-2.57)
polity -0.0255 -0.0272 -0.0272 -0.0152 -0.0151 -0.0151
(-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-0.88)
war -0.749** -0.737** -0.737** -0.370** -0.368** -0.368**
(-2.55) (-2.57) (-2.57) (-2.50) (-2.48) (-2.48)
t!1 UN2_US 1.175* 0.164
(1.78) (0.37)
t!2 UN2_US 1.175* 0.164
(1.78) (0.37)
t!1 )UN2_US -0.674** -1.152** 0.0233 0.374* 0.300 0.465
(-2.73) (-2.73) (0.06) (1.95) (1.04) (1.58)
N 2800 2800 2800 2196 2196 2196
t statistics in parentheses.  Computed from clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.05
All specifications include region and year dummies.28
Table 6 – AHT-type Eligibility Equations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. WB_elig WB_elig WB_elig WB_elig
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit
ln_pop 0.183** 0.188** 0.180** 0.182**
(4.24) (4.35) (4.15) (3.97)
ln_gdp -0.954** -0.950** -0.968** -0.829**
(-7.07) (-7.14) (-7.24) (-5.74)
FH -0.267** -0.282** -0.272** -0.228**
(-2.58) (-2.72) (-2.63) (-2.28)
polity -0.0190 -0.0234 -0.0191 -0.00799
(-0.74) (-0.90) (-0.74) (-0.35)
war -0.756** -0.754** -0.751** -0.820**
(-2.89) (-2.82) (-2.85) (-3.33)
t!1 UN1_US -2.896** -2.758** -2.159**
BA
(-3.46) (-4.16) (-2.63)






t!1 UN2_US 2.097** 1.572** 2.088** 2.161**
(3.86) (3.24) (3.88) (3.60)
N 2913 2899 2893 2742
t statistics in parentheses.  Computed from clustered standard errors.
* p<.1, ** p<.05
All specifications include region and year dummies.
 indicates the average value of UN1_US by country.
Fail to reject hypothesis that coefficients are equal (Column 4:  p=0.99)
A
Reject the hypothesis that coefficients are equal (Column 3: p=0.001)
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Table 7 – AHT-type Allocation Equations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg ln_WB_tofg
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
ln_pop 0.891** 0.889** 0.888** 0.871**
(24.04) (23.90) (23.66) (22.19)
ln_gdp -0.0448 -0.0468 -0.0495 -0.0288
(-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.29)
blend 0.0716 0.0750 0.0746 0.0806
(0.55) (0.58) (0.57) (0.62)
FH -0.167** -0.173** -0.170** -0.159**
(-2.63) (-2.74) (-2.68) (-2.55)
polity -0.0154 -0.0168 -0.0156 -0.0136
(-0.91) (-1.00) (-0.93) (-0.83)
war -0.368** -0.368** -0.370** -0.376**
(-2.53) (-2.53) (-2.54) (-2.65)
t-1 UN1_US -1.138 -0.507 -0.191
(-1.65) (-0.89) (-0.33)




t-1 UN2_US 0.703* 0.709* 0.794* 0.960**
(1.73) (1.92) (1.94) (2.34)
N 2266 2264 2259 2262
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05
All specifications include region and year dummies.
 indicates the average value of UN1_US by country.30
Table A1:  Data Sources
Variable Source
Economic aid flows OECD (2006), OECD (2007)
FH Freedom House (2007).
gdp, pop Heston et al. (2002), World Bank (2008)
polity Polity IV Project (2005)
U.S. military aid USAID (2008)
war Gleditsch et al. (2002)
UN Voeten (2006), U.S. State Department (1983-2007)